In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.3 (2002) 371-397 [Access article in PDF] How the "New Science" of Cannons Shook up the Aristotelian Cosmos Mary J. Henninger-Voss [Figures]Approximately halfway through the "Second Day" of Galileo's Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems Galileo's mouthpiece, the mathematician Salviati, scoffs at his Aristotelian colleague Simplicio: "I see that you have hitherto been of that herd who, in order to learn (...) how matters such as this [motion] take place, and in order to acquire a knowledge of natural effects, do not betake themselves to ships or crossbows or cannons, but retire to their studies... to see whether Aristotle has said anything about them."1 Silly, simple Simplicio! He has been searching for natural philosophical wisdom in the books of natural philosophers rather than in the world of docks and arsenals. Indeed this quotation appears near the outset of Day Two wherein Salviati offers cannonshot as proof for the opposing Aristotelian position that the experience of projectiles proves the motionless state of the earth. Obviously, if the earth rotates toward the east, cannonballs shot point-blank to the west ought to travel much further than to the east. And clearly this is not so. Simplicio agrees that the new arguments offered by the cannon are excellent, "and now I see with how many elegant experiments nature graciously wishes to aid us in coming to the recognition of the truth," Simplicio enthusiastically enjoins. "What a shame there were no cannons in Aristotle's time!" exclaims the third interlocutor, Sagredo. "With them he would indeed have battered down ignorance, and spoken without [End Page 371] [Begin Page 373] the least hesitation concerning the universe."2 The irony here is not only that Aristotle might have used cannons in order to explain the workings of the universe but also that Galileo does so in the following pages. His demonstrations with reference to artillery demolish the Aristotelian position, but he has had Simplicio open the door for him by recognizing this most violent of artifices as an elegant experiment provided by nature.3The cannon provides a primary referent for Galileo's new mathematical physics of motion from his very first dialogue to his very last. The early De Motu culminated in a series of questions about the shot of cannons, while the conversation in his final masterwork, Discourses Concerning Two New Sciences, was set in the Venetian arsenal, and to it Galileo appended a table of the parabolic paths that could be expected from cannons shot at various elevations.4 In some sense Galileo turned inside-out a much older problem, one that had haunted military engineers of sixteenth-century Italy—and Galileo had been trained, and trained others, in military engineering.5 State organizers of war and captain generals were less interested in the implications the arts of fortifications and artillery held for the existing science of natural motion than in the necessity to reduce to a science, that is, a coherent body of knowledge, the rules for manufacturing cannons, planting artillery battery, aiming guns, and fortifying camps, cities, and castles.What Galileo gives us is recognizable as early physics, as a sophisticated mechanical science, a neat triumph of mathematical method in natural philosophy. But the ways and means by which mathematics came together with natural philosophy to address problems of both technology and nature are by no means neat. My claim is that attention to the military sphere will help us sort out some of those ways and means. The curious thing about the historiography on the relationship between early modern science and warfare is that the fact of a connection seems to have been taken for granted, while the implications have seldom been investigated.6 This essay is an attempt to trace those implications by [End Page 373] looking at a mathematician who specifically tried to reduce to a mathematical science the military arts, Niccolò Tartaglia.7 Tartaglia's story shows how the minutia of Aristotelian philosophy was transmuted in early attempts to understand cannonshot... (shrink)

With a scene-setting historical introduction, this newly translated and illustrated edition of a classic work is an essential addition to any home library. Written in 1512, The Prince is the masterpiece by Florentine political philosopher, poet, and playwright Niccolò Machiavelli. Although Machiavelli’s book has been frequently misunderstood as a manual for unprincipled manipulators and tyrants, careful reading reveals that it actually identifies freedom as an essential characteristic of a good society. In fact, much of Machiavelli’s republican thought can be (...) identified in the American constitution, and many of his ideas — such as the belief that life is subject to change and that the winners will be those flexible enough to adapt—remain as applicable today as they were half a millennium ago. (shrink)

Enjoy two classics of tactical and strategic thinking together in one volume! Despite being separated by 2000 years and half a world, these famous works of Niccol Machiavelli and Sun Tzu have much in common. Both books were produced during times of great unrest and both have altered the course of political and military thought and practice for generations. This book contains the acclaimed English translations of W.K. Marriott for The Prince and Lionel Giles for The Art of War.

The paper presents an epistemic logic with quantification over agents of knowledge and with a syntactical distinction between de re and de dicto occurrences of terms. Knowledge de dicto is characterized as ‘knowledge that’, and knowlegde de re as ‘knowledge of’. Transition semantics turns out to be an adequate tool to account for the distinctions introduced.

v. 1. 1819-1826. (It 68-Jan)--v. 2. 1827-1855. (It 68-Mar).

This influential study contrasts the practices of ancient Rome with those of the author's 16th-century contemporaries. Machiavelli's The Prince offers advice on ruling a kingdom; this treatise explains the structure and benefits of a republic. Topics include establishing a republic's internal structure, conducting warfare, and exhibiting leadership qualities.

Dummett's logic LC quantified, Q-LC, is shown to be characterized by the extended frame Q+, ,D, where Q+ is the set of non-negative rational numbers, is the numerical relation less or equal then and D is the domain function such that for all v, w Q+, Dv and if v w, then D v . D v D w . Moreover, simple completeness proofs of extensions of Q-LC are given.

Assessing the scientific status of theories of consciousness is often a difficult task. In this paper, I explore the dialectic between the Integrated Information Theory, e1003588, 2014; Tononi et al. Nat Rev Neurosci, 17, 450-61, 2016) and a recently proposed criticism of that theory: the ‘unfolding argument’. I show that the phenomenology-first approach in consciousness research can lead to valid scientific theories of consciousness. I do this by highlighting the two reasons why the unfolding argument fails: first, phenomenology-first theories are (...) grounded, not circular. Second, falsificationism does not provide an adequate demarcation criterion in philosophy of science. I conclude that this specific debate has significance for how, in general, consciousness researchers test and criticize theories of consciousness, and how dismissing the phenomenology-first methodology in favour of a third person-based methodology means endorsing a position in philosophy of mind that has already been challenged. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a decision procedure for Dummett's logic LC, such that with any given formula will be associated either a proof in a sequent calculus equivalent to LC or a finite linear Kripke countermodel.

This Is A New Release Of The Original 1814 Edition.

Rosenkranz (2021) devised two bimodal epistemic logics: an idealized one and a realistic one. The former is shown to be sound with respect to a class of neighborhood frames called i-frames. Rosenkranz designed a specific i-frame able to invalidate a series of undesired formulas, proving that these are not theorems of the idealized logic. Nonetheless, an unwanted formula and an unwanted rule of inference are not invalidated. Invalidating the former guarantees the distinction between the two modal operators characteristic of the (...) logic, while invalidating the latter is crucial in order to deal with the problem of logical omniscience. In this paper, I present an i-frame able to invalidate all the undesired formulas already invalidated by Rosenkranz, together with the missing formula and rule of inference. (shrink)

The received view says that possibility is the dual of necessity: a proposition is (metaphysically, logically, epistemically etc.) possible iff it is not the case that its negation is (metaphysically, logically, epistemically etc., respectively) necessary. This reading is usually taken for granted by modal logicians and indeed seems plausible when dealing with logical or metaphysical possibility. But what about epistemic possibility? We argue that the dual definition of epistemic possibility in terms of epistemic necessity generates tension when reasoning about non-idealized (...) agents and is a problem of concern for most hyperintensional epistemic logics that alleviate the problem of logical omniscience. The tension is particularly evident when knowledge is taken as a primitive to define other epistemic concepts, such as justification and belief, as done in the knowledge-first tradition. We propose a non-dual interpretation of epistemic possibility, employing a hyperintensionality filter similar to the one that makes the corresponding epistemic necessity operator hyperintensional. We employ the proposed semantics to model Stalnaker's belief as epistemic possibility of knowledge and provide a sound and complete axiomatization for a hyperintensional version of his bimodal logic of knowledge and belief. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to introduce the logic QE-LC whose language contains the existence predicate E and which is characterized by the class of connected (Kripke) E-models with nested domains.

Theoretical approaches to public opinion are hard to find in the sociological literature, with the exception of the seminal work of Jürgen Habermas. One important alternative, although almost unknown in the English-speaking world, is offered in a few contributions by the systems theoretician Niklas Luhmann. Both critical theory and systems theory start from a historical analysis of the conditions that led to the rise of a public sphere and understand its function as the limitation and control of the arbitrariness of (...) power. Critical theory considers the public sphere as a social space where citizens can (or should) participate and discuss freely and without constraints. Thus, it legitimizes political power. Systems theory presents a completely different concept of the public sphere and conceives of it in terms of second-order observation. Through public opinion the modern political system observes itself and stimulates as well as limits its decision-making processes. This paper argues that both approaches share the idea that the political system, like every other social subsystem, must generate a system-specific uncertainty (i.e. specific conditions that it cannot control) in order to limit its own arbitrariness and to be able to develop its decision-making potential. Both approaches locate this uncertainty in the sphere of public opinion. But they radically differ in the way they conceptualize public opinion’s effects on modern politics. Such differences between critical theory and systems theory are illustrated by an analysis of recent political events. (shrink)

This paper discusses some aspects of the article by Azima and Mundler (2022). It is argued that the relationship between work and social satisfaction and direct selling is not necessarily linked to the existence of an opportunity cost of family labor. It is also argued that the effect of the share of direct sales over total shares is weak, while the substantial one is participation to direct selling per se, more than its share on total sales.

In the space of four years, from 1826 to 1829, the Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal published three anonymous articles seemingly advocating doctrines inspired by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck. Decades of scholarship have initially attributed the most outspoken of the three articles, the 1826 “Observations on the Nature and Importance of Geology,” to Robert Grant, and subsequently to Robert Jameson, thanks to a critical reassessment by James Secord. More recently, scholars have also ascribed to Jameson an article published in 1829, “Of the Continuity (...) of the Animal Kingdom by Means of Generation from the First Ages of the World to the Present Times.” A third short contribution, the 1827 “Of the Changes which Life has Experienced on the Globe” has been credited to the Franco-German Ami Boué. Research undertaken over several years has led to the identification of the three authors hiding behind the veil of anonymity. They were not the ones scholars have agreed upon, nor were they really “Lamarckians.” The discussion of the ways in which the three texts reached Edinburgh broadens our understanding of the daily working practices of contemporary periodicals and of the networks of circulation of texts at the Continental level. Finally, when considered within their proper conceptual and social context, the three articles throw light on the many ways in which, during the 1820s, European amateurs, naturalists, and journalists debated the succession of life forms throughout the history of the Earth. (shrink)

This article has as its aim to research on the Thomistic concepts of voluntary (voluntarium), involuntary (involuntarium) and mixed actions, with the purpose of putting into question the debate around this last category of actions. Building up the definitions of being voluntary or involuntary, Saint Thomas Aquinas works on the Aristotelian definitions adding the aspect of existing a will oriented by reason, keeping an intellectualist background in the actions. For Aquinas, in order that an action be voluntary many causes come (...) together, although the will must be its principle. On the contrary, there is the concept of being involuntary, that is defined just by those acts done by ignorance or violence (physical coercion). Here it is possible to realize the difference between both definitions, which will become more visible when we elaborate the Thomistic understanding around the mixed actions. The mixed actions put together aspects of the voluntary and involuntary ones in one action, which can be characterized more as voluntary if the will is taken as the principle of the human acting. Nonetheless, as we will show, Thomas Aquinas works with two concepts of mixed actions, one in his Commentary to the Nicomachean Ethics, and the other in his Summa Theologiae. Therefore, we will take as primary bibliography the Thomistic works and, as an interpretative support, the most recent works by the experts. (shrink)

In The Origin of Species, Darwin took care to avoid treating the question of the place of human beings in his theory and in the animal world: but he could scarcely avoid this question that was one of the major preoccupations of most of those who first commented on his work. In The Descent of Man (1871), he chose to tackle it head on. In that work, Darwin proposed that the sensory, and more broadly the intellectual and moral prerogatives found (...) in man, including the aesthetic appreciation of “beauty”, were shared by many animal species. He maintained that sexual selection, or the struggle for reproduction was responsible for the differences between males and females. For him, sexual selection was also the cause of complex forms of behaviour which, in humans, were probably the origin of the formation of human groups, known as races, and the development of cultures. Darwin the scientist and Darwin the Victorian male were thus engaged in a discussion in which gender prejudice and imperial pride were fully implicated. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “The Autopoiesis of Social Systems and its Criticisms” by Hugo Cadenas & Marcelo Arnold. Upshot: I discuss two aspects of Cadenas & Arnold’s target article. The first concerns some clarifications of the sociological importance of the concept of autopoiesis and the second the criticisms of this concept and its applications in the social sciences.

"This is an excellent, readable and vigorous translation of _The Prince_, but it is much more than simply a translation. The map, notes and guide to further reading are crisp, to-the-point and yet nicely comprehensive. The inclusion of the letter to Vettori is most welcome. But, above all, the Introduction is so gripping and lively that it has convinced me to include _The Prince_ in my syllabus for History of Western Civilization the next time that I teach it.... Great price, (...) too! And lovely printing and layout." --Rachel Fulton, _University of Chicago_. (shrink)

SummaryThis contribution examines the circumstances of composition of the annotated edition of Newton's Principia that was printed in Geneva in 1739–1742, which ran to several editions and was still in print in Britain in the mid-nineteenth century. This edition was the work of the Genevan Professor of Mathematics, Jean Louis Calandrini, and of two Minim friars based in Rome, Thomas Le Seur and François Jacquier. The study of the context in which this edition was conceived sheds light on the early (...) reception of Newtonianism in Geneva and Rome. By taking into consideration the careers of Calandrini, Le Seur and Jacquier, as authors, lecturers and leading characters of Genevan and Roman cultural life, I will show that their involvement in the enterprise of annotating Newton's Principia answered specific needs of Genevan and Roman culture. The publication and reception of the Genevan annotated edition has also a broader European dimension. Both Calandrini and Jacquier were in touch with the French république des lettres, most notably with Clairaut and Du Châtelet, and with the Bernoulli family in Basel. Therefore, this study is also relevant for the understanding of the dissemination of Newton's ideas in Europe. (shrink)

In this paper we present two calculi for intuitionistic logic. The first one, IG, is characterized by the fact that every proof-search terminates and termination is reached without jeopardizing the subformula property. As to the second one, SIC, proof-search terminates, the subformula property is preserved and moreover proof-search is performed without any recourse to metarules, in particular there is no need to back-track. As a consequence, proof-search in the calculus SIC is accomplished by a single tree as in classical logic.

Includes in their entirety The Prince, The Discourses, Belfagor, The Mandrake Root, Castruccio Castracani, abridged versions of The Art of War and The History of Florence, and a bibliography and chronology.

The aim of this paper is to show how the invention of imaginary logic by Nikolaj A. Vasil’ev, forerunner of various logical and metaphysical theories appeared in the 20th century, is grounded on a revaluation of Aristotelian ontology. I shall introduce the reason why Aristotle believes that the study of the principle of contradiction is part of ontology (§ 2); I shall explain why Vasil’ev considers the law of contradiction an empirical law, and not a logical one (§ 3.1). I (...) will show his conception of contradiction (§ 3.2) and I will discuss how he believes that it’s possible to renounce this law; (§ 3.3). I shall then explain the fundamental features of imaginary logic (§ 4.1 and § 4.2); and, finally I shall claim how, in spite of a convergence from the logical point of view (§ 5.1), the incompatibility of the two authors takes place on an ontological level (§ 5.2). In order to do so, I shall implement the analysis of the Aristotelian syllogistic conducted by the Polish logician and philosopher Jan Łukasiewicz, together with a crucial distinction between two concepts: the one of ‘law’ and the one of ‘principle’. -/- . (shrink)